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CIVIL PROCEDURE IN NEW MEXICO IN 1975
JERROLD L. WALDEN*

INTRODUCTION

Fortunately for those concerned with litigation in New Mexico,
the state has patterned its procedural requirements, for the larger
part, on the federal rules. This has simplified local practice considerably not only because the same standards of practice prevail in both
federal and state courts but also because the federal rules constitute a
well thought out code for civil practice which simplifies civil procedure and facilitates trial in the interests of justice.
In 1973 this author attempted to summarize the law of procedure
under the rules as interpreted by the courts of the state in a lengthy
treatise entitled Civil Procedure in New Mexico. In 1975 a supplement to this text prepared by the Institute of Public Law was issued
which, for all practical purposes, made this treatise current as of that
date. However, even in the short interval of a year the New Mexico
courts and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit have rendered
a number of important decisions in the field of procedure. It is
hoped that this survey will prove useful to those who have some
occasion to work with the aforementioned treatise as well as of
general interest to the practicing bar.
JURISDICTION

Ever since the landmark case of Pennoyer v. Neff' it has been
assumed that personal service of process on the defendant within the
state was sufficient basis to confer in personam jurisdiction on the
courts of the state from whence process issued. As for persons outside the state, the modem cases interpreting the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution have required
that the absent party have such minimum contacts with the state
seeking to exercise jurisdiction that to subject him to its process
would not offend minimum notions of fair play and justice. 2
In accordance with this standard, most states, New Mexico among
*Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law, and author of Civil Procedure in New Mexico (1973).

1. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).

2. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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them, have enacted long arm statutes purporting to specify those
contacts which are deemed to qualify under the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court.' Even though the tests specified in the
long arm statute are met, however, the inquiry in every case must
also run to whether the requisite minimum contacts were present in
order to satisfy the constitutional requirements of due process.
New Mexico's decisions under its long arm statute have in the past
extended the scope of state court jurisdiction to a remarkable
degree. 4 In 1975, however, the New Mexico Supreme Court decided
an important case which may well presage a more restrictive interpretation of the long arm statute. In Telephonic, Inc. v. Rosenblum'
plaintiff was a mortgage investment broker located in Albuquerque
who had arranged a loan for defendant Rosenblum, a resident of
California. In making arrangements for securing the loan Rosenblum
had never entered the state of New Mexico. Indeed, for aught it
appeared, Rosenblum had not been in New Mexico for ten years, if
at all. The loan was arranged pursuant to a contract which was signed
by defendant in California after preliminary negotiations by mail and
telephone. The contract, denominated "Authorization to Obtain
Loan," was returned by defendant to New Mexico, where it was
endorsed by an officer of plaintiff. To make a long story short,
plaintiff allegedly procured a loan for defendant pursuant to the
contract and sued defendant for the commission, effectuating service
of process in California under the terms of the New Mexico long arm
statute. The New Mexico Supreme Court on these facts found that
defendant had not transacted business in the state within the meaning of the long arm statute and therefore affirmed an order of the
district court quashing service and dismissing the complaint for lack
of jurisdiction over the person.
Plaintiff had argued that since it had signed the contract in New
Mexico after defendant had signed it in California, the contract was a
New Mexico contract upon which jurisdiction could be predicated
under the New Mexico long arm statute. The Supreme Court was
3. The New Mexico long arm statute, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-3-16 (Supp. 1975), for
example, designates five separate bases for exercising jurisdiction over absent persons-the
transaction of any business within the state, the operation of a motor vehicle on the
highways of the state; the commission of a tortious act within the state, contracting to
insure persons or property or risk within the state, and living in a marital state within the
state for purposes of alimony, child support or property settlements.
4. See, e.g., Winward v. Holly Creek Mills, Inc., 83 N.M. 469, 493 P.2d 954 (1972);
McIntosh v. Navarro Seed Co., 81 N.M. 302, 466 P.2d 868 (1970); Blount v. T D Publishing
Co., 77 N.M. 384, 423 P.2d 421 (1966); Hunter-Hayes Elevator Co. v. Petroleum Club Inn
Co., 77 N.M. 92, 419 P.2d 465 (1966); Pope v. Lydick Roofing Co., 81 N.M. 661, 472 P.2d
375 (1970); Melfi v. Goodman, 69 N.M. 488, 368 P.2d 582 (1962).
5. 88 N.M. 532, 543 P.2d 825 (1975).
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willing to assume, arguendo that New Mexico was the place of contracting, but emphasized that the place of execution of the contract,
although a factor to be taken into consideration, was neither a
"controlling," "essential," or even "a highly significant"
fact in
determining whether defendant had transacted business within the
state, citing those cases where jurisdiction had been sustained even
though New Mexico was not the place of contracting. Here was the
first error of the court's ways. The court was correct in assuming that
jurisdiction might exist if the contract were executed outside the
state.6 But if it be assumed that the contract was executed in New
Mexico, heretofore, New Mexico law has been that this was sufficient
minimum contact to sustain jurisdiction.7
Moreover, the court showed some confusion between the concept
of transacting business in the state, which is the requirement for
jurisdiction specified in the long arm statute, and doing business in
the state, which denotes some type of continuity of behavior. The
court indicated that the test for jurisdiction under the long arm
statute was that laid down in Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws § 35, comment a defining "what constitutes doing business."
However, the section that the court should have cited was Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 36, which premises jurisdiction
on "Doing an Act in the State." Comment e of that section states:
It is likewise reasonable that a state should exercise judicial jurisdiction over a nonresident individual as to causes of action arising from
an act done or caused to be done, by him in the state for pecuniary
profit and having substantial consequences there even though the act
is an isolated act not constituting the doing of business in the state.

The Restatement cites insurance and brokerage contracts as illustrative of the point.
Further indication that the New Mexico Supreme Court confused
transaction of business with doing business is indicated by the court's
reliance on a federal case decided in 1964.8 The applicable statute
providing for jurisdiction in that case was, unlike the New Mexico
long arm statute, that governing persons doing business within the
state which provided for jurisdiction only when the defendant did "a
series of acts" or a single act where the objective of doing the single
act demonstrated "the intention of thereby initiating a series of such
acts." The New Mexico long arm statute, on the other hand, refers to
the "transaction of any business" within the state and has been
6. Winward v. Holly Creek Mills, Inc., 83 N.M. 469, 493 P.2d 954 (1972); Hunter-Hayes
Elevator Co. v. Petroleum Club Inn Co., 77 N.M. 92, 419 P.2d 465 (1966).
7. Melfi v. Goodman, 69 N.M. 488, 368 P.2d 582 (1962).
8. Tudesco v. Publishers Co., 232 F. Supp. 638 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
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interpreted as applying to any single act done within the state standing by itself, irrespective of whether it constitutes part of or initiates
a series of acts. 9 As the New Mexico Supreme Court has declared:
"Our statute ... requires no such continuity of activity and a single
transaction is sufficient if it constitutes 'any transaction of business'
in the state." 1 0
The Supreme Court also analogized the case to those cases dealing
with real estate brokers who had brought suit in their own states to
recover commissions for securing tenants for nonresident defendants.
1
The court in particular relied on a recent Illinois decision ' which
refused to enforce a New York judgment secured under the New
York long arm statute by a New York broker who had obtained a
tenant for defendant, an Illinois resident. However, in a later Illinois
case, 1 2 another Illinois appellate court refused to follow this Illinois
case on the ground that it involved an interpretation of the New
York long arm statute by the New York courts and was therefore
inapplicable to deciding the stretch of the Illinois long arm statute
even though both the New York and Illinois statutes relied on the
transaction of business within the state as a basis for jurisdiction. In
the latter case, a nonresident corporation ordered by telephone
90,900 printed inserts from plaintiff, an Illinois corporation, in response to plaintiff's advertisement. The proof was sent to defendant
in Ohio for correction, and thereafter, the copies were shipped f.o.b.
to defendant in Ohio. On these facts, the Illinois court found jurisdiction under the Illinois long arm statute.
Even more in point is another Illinois case"3 in which defendant,
located in Michigan, responded by telephone to a flyer circulated by
mail to the metal working industry by plaintiff, an Illinois employment agency, and agreed to pay plaintiff a referral fee if he were
furnished the name of a prospective employee. Here, the court found
jurisdiction under the Illinois long arm statute even though "defendant's only contact within this state was a telephone call." It was
pointed out that defendant knew that it entered into a contract with
an Illinois resident which would perform its services in Illinois for a
fee. The court added, "Personal jurisdiction over a nonresident does
not depend upon the physical presence of the defendant within the
9. McIntosh v. Navarro Seed Co., 81 N.M. 302, 466 P.2d 868 (1970).
10. Id. at 304.
11. Davis v. Nehf, 14 11. App.3d 318, 302 N.E.2d 382 (1973).
12. Colony Press Inc., v. Fleeman, 17 Ill. App.3d 14, 308 N.E.2d 78 (1974).
13. Cook Associates, Inc., v. Colonial Broach & Mach. Co., 14 11. App.3d 965, 304
N.E.2d 27 (1973).
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state. It is sufficient that the act or transaction itself has a substantial
connection with the forum state."
This criticism of the Supreme Court decision in the instant case
has placed considerable emphasis on recent Illinois decisions because
the New Mexico long arm statute was derived from the Illinois statute, and for the most part Illinois cases are followed here. Indeed,
the Supreme Court pointed out that in the instant case that "Our
statute was taken from Illinois, and the interpretations by the Illinois
courts of the Illinois statute are persuasive." However, instead of
aligning itself with Illinois, New Mexico, if the court's opinion
stands, would appear to follow instead the more restrictive law of
New York, where the Court of Appeals has ruled that there "is no
transaction of business where an offer placed outside the State by
telephone is received and accepted in New York." ' 4
It was also argued before the New Mexico Supreme Court in
Rosenblum that, aside from jurisdiction under the long arm statute,
In the contract signed
jurisdiction had been secured by consent.'
by the defendant, it was provided that the "undersigned acknowledges ... that the undersigned is transacting business within the state
of New Mexico and that this Agreement and Authorization was
negotiated and accepted in and shall be governed by the laws of the
State of New Mexico."
The Supreme Court held that this provision was not sufficiently
definite to indicate a waiver of the defendant's constitutional right to
be tried in a forum with sufficient contacts not to violate notions of
fair play and substantial justice. The Supreme Court declared: "An
agreement to waive this constitutional right must be deliberately and
understandingly made, and language relied upon to constitute such a
waiver must clearly, unequivocally and unambiguously express a
waiver of this right." Unfortunately, the court did not offer any
14. Glassman v. Hyder, 23 N.Y.2d 354, 296 N.Y.S.2d 783, 244 N.E.2d 259 (1968);
accord: Electronic Devices, Inc., v. Marc Rogers Associates, 63 Misc.2d 243, 311 N.Y.S.2d
418 (1970); M. Katz & Son Billiard Products, Inc. v. G. Correale & Sons, Inc., 26 App.
Div.2d 52, 270 N.Y.S.2d 672, aff'd 20 N.Y.2d 903, 285 N.Y.S.2d 871, 232 N.E.2d 864
(1967). But cf Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc., v. Franklyn, 26 N.Y.2d 13, 256 N.E.2d 506
(1970).
15. Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 32 (1969). The landmark case in this
particular area is National Equipment Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964). In that
case, non-resident lessors of farm equipment signed a lease in which Flo Weinberg had been
designated as an agent for the acceptance of service of process in the State of New York.
The provision was contained in the form lease furnished by the lessors, and defendants had
no prior acquaintance with Ms. Weinberg. When lessees defaulted, suit was initiated in
federal court in New York and service effectuated by serving Ms. Weinberg, who duly gave
notice of suit to absent defendants in Michigan. The United States Supreme Court held that
Ms. Weinberg was an agent duly authorized by appointment to accept process under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 4(d)(1) and that service was good on the nonresident defendants.
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guidance as to what language might be used to secure defendant's
consent to jurisdiction which it might in the future sustain, but it is
difficult to envision clearer language than an admission on defendant's part that it was transacting business in the state of New Mexico, as was the case here.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit also dealt with the
subject of jurisdiction of New Mexico courts in the case of Budde v.
Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc.' 6 In that case, plaintiff, a citizen of Louisiana, was injured in Vietnam in 1970 while a passenger in a jeep
driven by an employee of a subsidiary of a subsidiary of corporate
defendant. Seeking to take advantage of New Mexico's three-year
statute of limitations on tort actions, plaintiff commenced suit in the
United States District Court for the District of New Mexico against
the employee, a subsidiary of corporate defendant, and corporate
defendant. Corporate defendant and subsidiary were served with process by delivery to the authorized agent of another of corporate
defendant's subsidiaries which was admittedly doing business in New
Mexico. Corporate defendant and subsidiary moved to quash service
and to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the person of defendants.
The motion was granted by the United States district judge, and
plaintiff appealed.
Service of process in this case was effectuated under N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 21-3-6 (Repl. 1970), which reads in part:
In all personal actions brought in any court of this state against any
foreign corporation process may be served upon any officer, director
or statutory agent of the corporation, either personally or by leaving
a copy thereof at his dwelling house or usual place of abode, or by
leaving a copy at the office or usual place of business of the foreign
corporation.
Service was made in this fashion rather than pursuant to the New
Mexico long arm statute because the latter clearly authorizes suits
only if arising out of defendant's specific acts within the state. Thus,
the question for decision in this case was: "Would LTV [corporate
defendant] and Kentron [subsidiary] (assuming arguendo they were
engaging in business in New Mexico under alter ego or agency
theories) be subject to process under New Mexico law for a cause of
action not arising from the corporation's New Mexico activities?"
The answer, said the court, must be found in New Mexico law, for
in diversity cases the question as to whether a corporation is amenable to state process is, unless constitutional questions arise, a matter
determined by state law. New Mexico Stat. Ann. § 21-3-6 (Repl.
16. 511 F.2d 1033 (10th Cir. 1975).
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1970) is silent on the question as to whether or not non-forum
created causes of action may be brought when service is effectuated
thereunder, and there is no New Mexico case law presently dealing
with the subject. Accordingly, the case was one of first impression in
which the federal courts would have to determine New Mexico state
law.
The Court of Appeals recognized that under Perkins v. Benguet
Consol. Mining Co."1 it was constitutionally permissible for New
Mexico to adjudicate non-forum created causes of action in its state
courts provided only that the requisite minimum contacts demanded
by International Shoe Co. v. Washington1 8 were present. However,
the Court of Appeals noted that the United States Supreme Court, in
some very old cases,' 9 had expressed a preference for interpreting
foreign corporation process acts as not extending to non-forum
created causes of action. In view of this consideration and giving
great weight to the fact that the trial court apparently thought New
Mexico law would preclude suit in this instance, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the order dismissing the action for lack of jurisdiction.
The decision by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in the
Budde case leaves much to be desired. In the first place, its reliance
on two old Supreme Court cases interpreting substituted service
statutes for corporations in states other than New Mexico is highly
unpersuasive. Moreover, the concepts of due process and expansion
of state court jurisdiction since the date of those decisions raises a
substantial question as to their continued vitality. Deference paid by
the court to the district judge in deciding questions of New Mexico
law is in this instance uncalled for in view of the obvious fact that
there is no New Mexico law on the subject and the federal courts will
be making law for New Mexico in any event. Certainly in this
instance the Court of Appeals is in as good if not a better position to
make this determination than the district judge. More important, the
decision itself renders the substituted service act, N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 21-3-6 (Repl. 1970) redundant, for if it is confined solely to
forum-created causes of action, it serves no greater purpose than the
long arm statute, which has the same limitation. In other words,
inasmuch as jurisdiction can be secured under the long arm statute
for forum-created causes of action in any event, the substituted
17. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
18. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
19. Morris & Co. v. Skandinavia Ins. Co., 279 U.S. 405 (1929); Louisville & N.R.R. v.
Chatters, 279 U.S. 320 (1929).
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service act, as construed by the Court of Appeals, is now largely
superfluous.
CLASS ACTIONS

Class actions have become an important procedural device for
securing rights of litigants, particularly in cases in which the small
amount of recovery involved if suit were brought by an individual
alone would ordinarily leave a defendant free of liability. Class
actions have accordingly become an important phenomenon on the
current judicial scene.
Two very important cases concerning class actions were handed
down in New Mexico during the year. The cases, both decided by the
New Mexico Court of Appeals, reveal two quite divergent approaches
to the problem of class actions in the state.
While the rule relating to class actions in the federal courts has
recently been amended in an effort to resolve some of the many
problems that had been encountered thereunder,2 0 New Mexico still
20. New Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 reads:
(a) Prerequisitesto a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue
or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions
of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of
the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for
the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other
members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede
their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole;
or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the
findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually
controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and
nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or
against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties
likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
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adheres to old Rule 23 concerning class actions, which provides as
follows:
If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one [11 or
more, as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on
behalf of all, sue or be sued, when the character of the right sought
to be enforced for or against the class is:
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be Maintained;
Notice; Judgment;Actions Conducted Partiallyas Class Actions.
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as
a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so
maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be
altered or amended before the decision on the merits.
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the court shall
direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the
court will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B)
the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not
request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclusion may,
if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(1) or (b) (2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and
describe those whom the court finds to-be members of the class. The judgment
in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b) (3), whether or
not favorable to the class, shall include and specify or describe those to whom
the notice provided in subdivision (c) (2) was directed, and who have not
requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of the class.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a
class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided into
subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule
shall then be construed and applied accordingly.
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to which this
rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders: (1) determining the
course of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition or
complication in the presentation of evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for
the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of
the action, that notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to
some or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed
extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether
they consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present
claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action; (3) imposing conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the
pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to representation
of absent persons, and that the action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with
similar procedural matters. The orders may be combined with an order under,
Rule 16, and may be altered or amended as may be desirable from time to
time.
(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed
dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such
manner as the court directs.
As amended Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966.
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(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of
a primary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the
class thereby becomes entitled to enforce it;
(2) several, afid the object of the action is the adjudication of
claims which do or may affect specific property involved in the
action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and a common relief is sought.

Class actions are also authorized in New Mexico under N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 21-6-1 (Repl. 1970), which provides:
When the question involved in a cause of action is one of common or
general interest to many persons, or where the parties are numerous

and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one [1] or
more persons may sue or defend for the benefit of the whole number of persons so interested in said cause of action.
Since the New Mexico courts have been the scene of only occasional
class actions over the years, there has heretofore been little judicial
construction of the above provisions of law authorizing class suits
which could provide guidance for litigants. Thus two important decisions emanating from the New Mexico Court of Appeals during the
year would naturally be awaited with considerable anticipation by
those concerned with developments in the law of civil procedure.
In Ridley v. First National Bank in Albuquerque,2" however, the
Court of Appeals handed down a decision which indicated that class
actions would henceforth be viewed with considerable hostility by
the courts and the future use of the class action as a procedural
device in New Mexico would be very restricted indeed.
In Ridley plaintiffs, representing the class, bought new cars from
Art Janpol Volkswagen. In the course of the purchases, they all
signed installment contracts. Art Janpol transferred the instruments
to the First National Bank, which, upon default, repossessed the cars
and notified defendants by mail that their cars would be resold within five days unless satisfactory arrangements could be made. The cars
were then sold after the five-day period had elapsed to the original
seller, Art Janpol, for the amount due on the installment contracts.
Subsequently, the cars were sold to other car purchasers in the open
market. On these facts the district court found that a class suit to
recover damages against the First National Bank and Art Janpol for
the wrongful resale of repossessed autos was appropriate and issued
its order to that effect. Defendants then filed an interlocutory appeal
with the Court of Appeals.
21. 87 N.M. 184, 531 P.2d 607 (1974),cert. den. 87 N.M. 179, 531 P.2d 602 (1975).
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Rule 23 delineates three types of class actions which have been
denominated by legal scholars adhering to the philosophy of Prof. J.
W. Moore as true, hybrid, and spurious. In this case, there was no
dispute as to which of the three types of class actions was involved in
the case at hand, it being agreed by all parties that the action was
brought under Rule 23 (a)(3) dealing with so-called spurious class
suits. The only question was whether the prerequisites of the rule for
maintaining such actions had been met.
The requirements laid down by Rule 23 for a class action of the
spurious type are: that there exist a definable class of persons, that
there exist common questions of law or fact pertaining to each member of the definable class of persons, and finally, that plaintiffs
adequately represent the absent members of the class. The district
court in the instant case found all of these factors to exist. However,
the Court of Appeals reversed because it found that there were no
common questions of law or fact involved in the case and, further,
that the representation by plaintiffs of the class was inadequate.
With regard to the existence vel non of common questions of law
or fact, the district court found in Ridley that the following common
questions existed: "The legal sufficiency and propriety of the notice
of repossession and resale, the commercial reasonableness of the resale
of vehicles, and whether a public or private sale is appropriate." 2 2
The Court of Appeals, however, disagreed. It alluded to the Uniform
Commercial Code, which defines reasonable time as follows:
What is a reasonable time for taking any action
depends on the
2
nature, purpose and circumstances of such action. 3

It therefore concluded therefrom that "the Uniform Commercial
Code calls for a case by case determination of reasonable notification. "

4

Accordingly, a class action was inappropriate.

The court was clearly wrong here, however, for, as is pointed out
in Judge Sutin's dissenting opinion, the five-day period for disposition of the collateral contained in the bank's letter of notification
may be unreasonable as a matter of law. With the mail service one
gets even in the City of Albuquerque these days, the unfortunate
debtor may well find his collateral disposed of by the bank even
before he receives notice of the sale. Further, only notice of the
resale of the collateral to the dealer is given, and the debtor receives
no notice at all of the disposition of the collateral by the dealer on
22. 87 N.M. 184, 186, 531 P.2d 607, 609.
23. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 50A-1-204(2) (Repl. 1962).
24. 87 N.M. 184, 186, 531 P.2d 607, 609.
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the open market. Here again, reasonable notification may be lacking
within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Another common question of law or fact in the case which the
Court of Appeals denied existed was whether the bank's resale of the
cars to the dealer for the amount outstanding on the contract and
the dealer's subsequent resale with no accounting to the plaintiffs
was a commercially reasonable method of disposing of collateral
within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code. 2" Once again,
the Court of Appeals held that what is commercially reasonable must
be determined on a case by case basis, and hence the question was
unsuitable for litigation in a class action. But, as the dissent points
out, there are decisions in various jurisdictions indicating that the
method adopted by defendants for disposing of repossessed collateral
in Ridley is itself not commercially reasonable within the meaning of
the Uniform Commercial Code.2 6 Thus it seems quite clear that a
common question existed as to the reasonableness of the practice
adopted by the bank of reselling repossessed collateral to car dealers
for the amount outstanding on the installment contract pursuant to a
repurchase agreement.
Aside from the absence of common questions of law or fact, the
New Mexico Court of Appeals also found that plaintiffs did not
adequately represent the absent members of the class. It did so primarily on the ground that the bank had the right to counterclaim
and that the counterclaims would raise non-common as against common questions. The existence of non-common questions, however,
has never been thought to preclude class actions, and if the right to
counterclaim constitutes a bar to class actions, it will seldom be
possible to institute a class action in New Mexico because Rule 13,
providing for permissive and compulsory counterclaims in all actions,
would foreclose a class action in every instance where a class action is
initiated by plaintiffs.
Ridley is a large step backward in the development of class actions
in New Mexico. Heretofore there has been little if any case law on
class actions in New Mexico, and this would have been the occasion
for making the class action device a viable force in New Mexico
litigation. Instead, the New Mexico Court of Appeals gave a narrow
interpretation of the rule which will confine class actions to very
limited circumstances in the future. As Judge Sutin points out in his
25. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 50A-9-504(3) (Supp. 1975).
26. Community Management Assoc. of Colorado Springs, Inc. v. Tousley, 505 P.2d 1314
(Colo. App. 1973); Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 60 Misc.2d 138, 302 N.Y.S.2d 340
(Civ. Ct. N.Y. Co., 1969); Rangel v. Bock Motor Co., 437 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. Civ. App.
1969).
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well-reasoned dissenting opinion, ".

.

. [T] his case will have a critical

impact on future attempts at litigation under § 2 1-1-1(23)(a). The
overwhelming weight of authority on the issues raised here argues
that the suit should be permitted to proceed as a class action. Not to
allow a class action is to make a nullity of Rule 23(a)(3)."'7
A much more liberal construction of Rule 23, however, was
handed down by the New Mexico Court of Appeals in O'Hare v.
Valley Utilities.2 s There, a class action was brought by five individual plaintiffs and Adobe Acres Improvement Association on behalf
of themselves and all other water users in the Adobe Acres subdivision, consisting of 475 homes, against the utility that furnishes water
to the subdivision, seeking damages for failure on the part of the
utility to provide water meeting certain minimum standards. The
defendant objected to the action as a class action. However, the jury
rendered a verdict for $1,000 for each of the members of the class.
The trial judge entered a judgment for 272 persons who were members of the association and directed that notice be given to other
residents of the subdivision allowing them to intervene upon application.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals found no objection to the class
action as such, unlike its earlier decision in Ridley. Instead, it
addressed itself to the question of whether the class action brought
by the association was a "true," "hybrid" or "spurious" class action
within the meaning of Prof. Moore's analysis of old Rule 23 of the
federal rules. Heretofore, there had been no judicial interpretation
of New Mexico Rule 23, which parallels old Rule 23 of the federal
rules, so it was not known whether the Moore categories would be
adopted here. This question was put to rest when the Court of
Appeals, although acknowledging that the threefold classification
had been questioned, declared "nonetheless we shall accord the traditional interpretation to our rule, since it has not been amended." 2"9
The significance of adopting the Moore classifications, insofar as
legal rights are concerned, is that the true class action is deemed binding on absent parties, the hybrid class action is only binding with
respect to the res involved, and the spurious class action is only
binding as to members of the class who actually join as parties. Thus,
the principal inquiry for the Court of Appeals was which of the
various class actions was involved in the instant case, for as the court
said, once the classification is determined, the question of whether
the judgment is binding on absent parties is resolved.
27. 87 N.M. 184, 195, 531 P.2d 607, 618.
28. " N.M.
,547 P.2d 1147 (Ct. App. 1976).
29. Id., 547 P.2d at 1151.
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Plaintiffs contended that the association constituted a true class
for purposes of Rule 23 and that, therefore, the judgment in favor of
the class bound the entire membership in the amount found by the
jury for each homeowner. The test for a true class action is whether
the right sought to be enforced is a joint or common one, and there
was much force to plaintiff's argument. Indeed, the Court of Appeals
recognized that "In this case a persuasive argument can be made that
all plaintiffs have been injured by the same breach of duty by the
defendant and in this sense claim a common right." 3 0
However, the court found that the class action insofar as members
of the association were concerned was a spurious class action, the
principal characteristics of which are "that common questions of law
and fact relating to the defendant's actions are raised by their
claims."' Thus final judgment in the amount of each of the association members' claims was improper.
Fortunately, however, this did not prove fatal to plaintiffs' class
action, for the Court of Appeals chose to sanction the procedure
adopted by the trial court with respect to those members of the class
who did not belong to the association. With regard to those water
users, admittedly members of a spurious class, the trial court deferred entry of judgment until all such residents wishing to take
advantage of the jury verdict could intervene. The Court of Appeals,
citing the leading case decided in the federal courts under old Rule
23, 3 2 remanded with directions to the trial judge to adopt the same
procedure with respect to the members of the association. This
would allow recovery on the basis of the class action proceeding by
members of the association upon intervention after notice and give
full effect to the class action device.
The decision of the Court of Appeals in this case is to be commended. The alternative to a class action would be 475 suits, each
seeking damages in the amount of $1,000 and burdening courts,
juries, the legal profession, and the litigants with multiple litigation.
No sound reason can be advanced why the class action should not
proceed in this case, and the Court of Appeals has done much in its
decision to revive class actions after what appeared to be their demise
earlier in the year in Ridley. The New Mexico Supreme Court has
granted certiorari in this case, and it is to be hoped that the decision
will be affirmed.*
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1962).
[*Since this article was written, the Adobe Acres case was reversed in part by the New
Mexico Supreme Court, 15 N.M. St. Bar Bull. 1091 (June 1, 1976).]
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT
There were some
judgment in New
example, the New
summary judgment
Corp.3 4

significant developments in the law of summary
Mexico this year. In Skarda v. Skarda,3 3 for
Mexico Supreme Court in a decision involving
reiterated its earlier holding in Garrett v. Nissen

that the trial court need not give any reasons for a grant of

summary judgment. In this instance, the trial court in granting summary judgment against plaintiff merely adopted the following finding
of fact in its order:
Based on the pleadings, affidavits and instruments on file, the Court
finds there is no genuine issue-of material fact as to the allegations of
the complaint.
The Supreme Court of New Mexico found this sufficient, although
there was no opinion of the trial court accompanying the order nor
were there detailed findings of fact.
At one time, the Supreme Court of New Mexico had required a
more exacting standard of behavior on the part of trial judges ruling
on summary judgment. In Wilson v. Albuquerque Board of Realtors3 I the Supreme Court as recently as 1970 had declared:
[I] n involved cases where the reason for the summary judgment is
not otherwise clearly apparent from the record, the trial court
should state its reasons for granting it in a separate opinion or in a
recital in the judgment.
In passing on the merits of a rule requiring findings of the lower
court in cases granting summary judgment, the earlier holding of the
Supreme Court in the Wilson case seems preferable. Without any
indication as to why the lower court has granted a motion for summary judgment, the Supreme Court on review is really left in the
dark. This means that the Supreme Court on appeal will, in effect,
have to review de novo all of the possible grounds for sustaining the
motion. Certainly, an articulation of the trial court's reasoning could
do much to reduce the burden of the appellate court and obviate
inquiry into matters not considered or raised at the lower level. In
addition, requiring the trial judge to specify his reasons for granting
summary judgment may have a salutary effect in that he will be
forced to examine very carefully and explain his reasons for granting
the motion, thereby making him confront the issues squarely and
directly.
33. 87 N.M. 497,536 P.2d 257 (1975).
34. 84 N.M. 16, 498 P.2d 1359 (1972).
35. 81 N.M. 657, 661, 472 P.2d 371 (1970).
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How helpful an explanation of the reasons for granting summary
judgment by the trial court may be on appeal is exemplified in
another case decided this year by the Court of Appeals, McNutt v.
New Mexico State Tribune.3 6 There, choosing to go beyond the rule
laid down by the Supreme Court in Skarda, the trial judge gave a
lengthy amplification of its reasons for granting defendants' motions
for summary judgment. In this case, defendants had published in
their newspaper, the Albuquerque Tribune, the names and addresses
of certain police officers who had engaged in a shoot-out on Black
Mesa in which two members of the Brown Berets had been killed. In
granting summary judgment for the defendants, the trial court, in
sharp contrast to the judge in Skarda v. Skarda, elaborated his
reasons in detail as follows:
That the names of these individuals and their addresses were within
the public domain, or rather a matter of public record as such, if not
official records...
The court holds as a matter of law that this is a newsworthy article.
That ... to extend the cause of action ... that is the invasion of
privacy . .. would be to deny to the newspaper its Constitutional

right of freedom of the press...
Because while it might be a little more difficult to come in contact
with an individual whose address has not been published than one
who has, if the name is published, the name alone, anyone who
would want to contact such an individual for whatever purpose,
would have no difficulty in doing so, even by just identifying the
individual in other respects, such as the position he holds, if there is
only one position of that kind. 3 7

With attention clearly focused on the issues by the trial court, it
was thereafter very easy for the Court of Appeals to come right to
the point. "We agree with the reasoning of the trial court," declared
the Court of Appeals in affirmance.
First National Bank v. Nor-Am Agr. Prod., Inc. 3 8 provided the
occasion for the Court of Appeals to summarize conveniently the
general principles underlying the law of summary judgment in New
Mexico for the benefit of students and practitioners. The case involved was the important one of the Hucklebys who had eaten meat
from hogs which had been fed grain treated with mercury. As a
result, the Huckleby children were stricken with organic mercury
poisoning causing permanent blindness, paralysis and other effects on
36. 88 N.M. 162, 538 P.2d 804 (Ct. App. 1975).
,538 P.2d 804, 807.
37. Id. at
38. 88 N.M. 74, 537 P.2d 682 (Ct. App. 1975).
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the central nervous system. In a suit against the manufacturer of the
toxic substance, the trial court had granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment. The Court of Appeals reversed. In so doing, it
gave a convenient precis of the law of summary judgment in New
Mexico, setting forth the following general rules:
1. A summary judgment proceeding is not to decide an issue of

fact, but rather, to determine whether one exists.
2. Summary judgment can be granted only where the record
shows there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.
3. The party opposing the motion for summary judgment must
be given the benefit of all reasonable doubts in determining whether

an issue of fact exists.
4. Summary judgment can be granted only where the moving
party is entitled to the judgment as a matter of law, upon clear and
undisputed facts.

5. Summary judgment proceedings must not be used as a substi-

tute for trial. 3 9

In McNutt v. New Mexico State Tribune the Court of Appeals had
the opportunity to clarify the distinction between the motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and the
motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. In that case, defendants, on July 11, 1972, moved under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. Their motion was denied. Subsequently, defendants moved
for summary judgment under Rule 56, and the motion was granted.
On appeal it was argued that the order granting the motion for
summary judgment was in error, since the ruling denying the motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim was res judicata on the point.
The court properly rejected this contention, pointing out that the
motion under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss for failure to state a claim
presented only the question of the sufficiency of the complaint itself. In deciding such a motion, all the well-pleaded allegations of the
complaint are taken as true. The purpose of summary judgment, on
the other hand, is to penetrate the pleadings and determine whether
or not the plaintiff actually has a triable claim, whatever the allegations in the complaint may be. The former motion goes to the question: Does the plaintiff state a claim for relief; whereas the latter
motion deals with the question of whether the plaintiff has a meritorious claim, irrespective of how he states it.
In Feldman v. Regents of the Univ. of New Mexico4" defendants
employed an interesting variant on the motion for summary judg39. Id. at
, 537 P.2d 682, 688.
40. 88 N.M. 392, 540 P.2d 872 (Ct. App. 1975).
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ment which is authorized under the rules. Plaintiff had contracted
with the University of New Mexico to serve as head football coach
for a five-year period. During the term of the contract, plaintiff was
discharged, and suit was brought to recover damages for breach. The
defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and on the
ground that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
When the motion came on for a hearing, the parties stipulated that
the court could consider evidence outside the pleadings and that the
motion, although originally brought under Rule 12(b)(6), should be
treated as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. The conversion of a 12(b)(6) motion to a Rule 56 motion when outside
evidence is considered is expressly sanctioned by the rules, which
provide:
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for
failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary
judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56 . .. "
Aside from the manner in which the motion for summary judgment arose in Feldman, the Court of Appeals made some important
observations regarding the law of summary judgment which throw
considerable light on when a particular motion will be granted or
denied. The court pointed out that in a motion for summary judgment, the burden rests upon the moving party to make out a prima
facie case that there is no genuine issue of fact or that he is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Only after this burden is met must
the opponent come forth with evidence to demonstrate that there is
a genuine issue of fact or that movants are not entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. In this case, defendants, moving parties, failed to
sustain their burden. In the first place, the court pointed out that
whether plaintiff was an officer of the university and therefore subject to discharge whenever the regents deemed it to be in the best
interests of the university was a question of fact rather than a question of law and that defendants had not made a prima facie showing
the plaintiff was such an officer. Next, the court pointed out that
with respect to the question of whether plaintiff had exhausted his
administrative remedies or not, there was nothing in the record to
indicate whether the coach had or had not exhausted his remedies.
Accordingly, again there was nothing in the record to make out a
41. N.M.R. Civ. P. 12(b); accord: Shriners Hospitals for Crippled Children v. Kirby Cattle
548 P.2d 449 (1976).
N.M.
Co.,
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prima facie case and shift the burden to the party opposing movants.
Accordingly, defendants were not entitled to summary judgment.
Comparing Feldman with the case of Rainbo Baking Co. of Albuquerque, Inc. v. Apodaca 2 proves illuminating. That case also involved a motion for summary judgment, this time on behalf of
plaintiff. In contrast to its holding in the Feldman case, this time the
court found that plaintiff had met the burden of establishing a prima
facie case for summary judgment by attaching as evidence a signed
statement of defendant admitting to having forged invoice tickets
and to embezzling $6,240.99 from plaintiff, and a promissory note
for repayment of the embezzled amount. However, the summary
judgment granted plaintiff by the lower court was nonetheless improper because defendant by way of affidavit and deposition had
denied embezzlement, forgery and voluntarily signing the confession.
Accordingly, the court held that the motion should have been denied
because:
Defendant met the burden of showing that there was a genuine issue
of fact as to plaintiffs' claim of embezzlement, conversion, fraud and
forgery. In his affidavit opposing the motion for summary judgment,
defendant contended that he did not voluntarily sign the statement
and note prepared by Kimbell's security officer, which note and
statement were the sole items of evidence offered by the plaintiffs in
43
support of their motion for summary judgment.
In Kirby Cattle Co. v. Shriners Hospitals for Crippled Children,4 4
the Court of Appeals reversed the entry of summary judgment
against plaintiff by the trial court. In that case, plaintiff sought to
compel specific performance of an option to bid competitively for
two parcels of land owned by defendant in Taos County. Defendant
raised as a defense in its answer the fact that plaintiff failed to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted and on the same day
made a motion to that effect. After considerable procedural maneuvering, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss and at the same
time also entered summary judgment for the defendant sua sponte.
This ruling was reversed for as the court pointed out:
From December 12, 1973, the time Shriners filed its motion to
dismiss, to February 3, 1975, the time summary judgment was
entered, there was no indication that the matter of summary judgment in any form was considered by the parties or the court.
42. 88 N.M. 501, 542 P.2d 1191 (Ct. App. 1975).
43. Id. at
,542 P.2d 1191, 1193.
44. 88 N.M. 605, 544 P.2d 1170 (Ct. App., 1975), rev'd,
(1976).

N.M.

, 548 P.2d 449
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None of the provisions of Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil Procedure ... on summary judgment were complied with. No motion for
summary judgment was served or filed. Neither was Kirby given a
45
reasonable opportunity to present evidence pertinent to his claim.

This decision was later reversed by the Supreme Court, however,
on the ground that in passing on the motion to dismiss matters
outside the pleadings were considered by the trial court which converted the motion to4 one for summary judgment under the specific
terms of Rule 12(b). 6
In concluding a review of summary judgment in New Mexico
during 1975, one is impressed by several facts. The summary judgment device is increasingly being utilized by practitioners in New
Mexico to obviate the need for wasteful trials where no genuine
issues exist. This contrasts sharply with earlier years when the
motion for summary judgment was seldom utilized in the state
courts. Furthermore, one is impressed with the delineation by the
appellate courts of a generally sound jurisprudence regarding the use
of summary judgment throughout the state. This should provide
standards which district courts and practitioners can easily follow and
encourage the use of summary judgment in the future in appropriate
proceedings.
DISMISSALS

Problems that may arise when attorneys fail to review the work of
their secretaries with care are exemplified by the case of Telephonic,
Inc. v. Montgomery Plaza Co.4" There, plaintiff sued defendant for
breach of contract. Having a change of heart, plaintiff then filed a
notice of dismissal. The notice of dismissal, however, instead of reading "without prejudice," stated "with prejudice." Plaintiff's
attorney's secretary had made this mistake in transcribing the dictation, and the attorney had failed to catch the error before filing the
document in question. Now, realizing his mistake, plaintiff's attorney
sought to correct the notice by motion under Rule 60(a) relating to
the correction of clerical errors. This motion was denied by the trial
court. Meanwhile, defendant answered the complaint and filed a
counterclaim, whereupon plaintiff moved to dismiss the original
complaint without prejudice, and to dismiss the counterclaim as well.
The trial court at this juncture granted plaintiff's motion.
When this comedy of errors appeared before the Court of Appeals
for resolution the court pointed out that under Rule 41 (a)(1), plain,542 P.2d 1170, 1173-74.
45. Id. at
,548 P.2d 449 (1976).
N.M.
46.
47. 87 N.M. 407, 534 P.2d 1119 (Ct. App. 1975).
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tiff had an absolute right to take a voluntary nonsuit without prejudice at any time before an answer had been served. Here, plaintiff
purportedly took such action, but due to clerical error, the dismissal
was taken with prejudice. Accordingly, the lower court erred in not
allowing plaintiff to correct his error. This was certainly an appropriate resolution of the problem, but the case should serve as a warning
to attorneys who fail to take proper precautions to review the work
of their secretaries. The courts may not always prove so generous.
The effect in subsequent litigation of the granting of a motion to
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted arose in the interesting case of Watkins v. Local
School Bd. of Los Alamos Schools.4 8 Plaintiff alleged that after
being employed as a teacher by the Los Alamos School Board for
three years she had an entitlement to future employment and that in
violation thereof she had been dismissed. Plaintiff claimed the real
reason for her discharge was her expression of views relating to the
Los Alamos school system and that the discharge thus violated her
constitutional rights. Plaintiff alleged damages and sought injunctive
relief. Prior to the instant case, plaintiff had previously sought a
mandatory injunction and money damages against the school board
in cause No. 44376 in Santa Fe County. In that case, the complaint
had been dismissed without prejudice with leave to amend, but plaintiff had taken no further action. Based on the prior dismissal, defendants moved to dismiss on the ground, inter alia, of res judicata. This
case presented the question of the effect of a prior dismissal of a
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted with leave to amend on subsequent litigation.
At common law, judgment on a demurrer was completely dispositive of the entire action. 4 9 Now, however, in most jurisdictions
plaintiffs are usually given leave to amend their complaints to afford
them every chance to state a good cause of action and to eliminate
the disposition of important cases on the technicalities of the pleadings. In this connection, Rule 15 provides that plaintiff may amend
his complaint once as a matter of course before any responsive pleading has been filed, and thereafter, plaintiff may amend with permission of the court, but "leave shall be freely given when justice so
requires." What is the effect of suit number one, however, where
plaintiff's complaint has been dismissed for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted with leave to amend and plaintiff
fails to take advantage of the opportunity to amend but instead files
another action? Does the dismissal in the first suit constitute a bar to
48. 88 N.M. 276, 540 P.2d 206 (1975).
49. B. Shipman, Common Law Pleading 287 (3d ed. 1923).
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filing of the second action, or is the dismissal without prejudice so as
to permit plaintiff to seek relief in another law suit? Justice Traynor
in Keidatz v. Albany," ° a leading case on point, set forth three
general rules for determining the effect of a prior suit where dismissal
is on demurrer which may be summarized as follows:
1. A judgment dismissing the complaint "is a judgment on the
merits to the extent that it adjudicates that the facts alleged do
not constitute a cause of action and will, accordingly, be a bar to
a subsequent action alleging the same facts."
2. If the ground for sustaining the demurrer in suit no. 1 be equally
applicable to suit no. 2, it will be a bar "even though different
facts ... be alleged."
3. "If, on the other hand, new or additional facts, are alleged that
cure the defects in the original pleading,... the former judgment
is not a bar ...whether or not plaintiff had an opportunity to
amend his complaint." 5 1
Justice Traynor's views find substantial support in the Restatement
of Judgements § 50, comments c and e. However, there is some
authority to the effect that if leave to amend is given upon the
granting of defendant's motion to dismiss, then the decision in the
first suit will be res judicata in any event.' 2
The Supreme Court of New Mexico in Watkins held the plaintiff
barred by the prior dismissal of her complaint with leave to amend.
This holding would seem correct under the strict rule of res judicata
which holds that any dismissal with leave to amend bars a second suit
on the same cause of action. It would also seem to accord with Justice
Traynor's more liberal rules in that it appears from the record that
the dismissal in the first action was based upon a determination that
plaintiff did not have an entitlement to future employment under
the laws of New Mexico. Thus, even though the Santa Fe action only
alleged "some but not all of the theories of recovery and relief
alleged in the instant case," the case would seem to be governed by
rule two of Justice Traynor's three rules, namely that the ground for
sustaining the demurrer would be the same-no entitlement-even
though some different facts might have been alleged in the second
law suit.
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES
An interesting case involving the question of indispensable parties
50. 39 Cal.2d 826, 249 P.2d 264 (1952).
51. Id. at 828, 249 P.2d 264, 265.
52. F. James, Civil Procedure 575 (1965); Note, Developments in the Law-ResJudicata,
65 Harv. L. Rev. 818, 837 (1952).
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arose in New Mexico during the year. In American General Cos. v.
Jaramillo' ' defendant was employed as a salesman and collector by
United Wholesale Liquor Co. During the course of his employment,
defendant allegedly converted funds due and owing his employer.
Plaintiff bonding company had paid the amount of the defalcation to
United Wholesale and now sued defendant to recoup its losses. Defendant contended that the employer was an indispensable party,
relying on the landmark New Mexico case of Sellman v. Haddock.5 4
In Sellman plaintiff's car was damaged by defendant in the
amount of $533.2 1. Plaintiff, covered by a standard $50 deductible
policy, received $438.21 from his insurer and paid the balance himself. However, he demanded judgment against defendant for the
entire loss. In this case it was held that the insurer was an indispensable party inasmuch as it was a partial subrogee of the outstanding
claim. In the instant action, however, it was the insurer rather than
the insured which sought recovery. Thus, as Judge Sutin emphasized,
"This case is not in point. The parties are reversed." ' ' Insurer was a
subrogee of employer's claim against defendant and as such was the
real party in interest in bringing the law suit. Complete relief could
be accorded between the parties in the absence of the employer
because the employer, having been totally reimbursed by insurer, had
no remaining interest in the litigation. This is the real test of Rule 19,
which for all intents and purposes has done away with the old indispensable party rule. Thus the court properly held that the insured
was not an indispensable party within the meaning of the rule.
DISCOVERY
The question as to applicable sanctions for failure to comply with
discovery orders under the rules arose in the case of Miller v. City of
Albuquerque."6 An assistant city attorney was held in contempt of
court for failing to produce witnesses for depositions pursuant to
court order. In addition, the attorney and the City of Albuquerque
were ordered to pay attorney's fees for refusing to permit discovery.
The order required that the former reimburse plaintiffs "for attorney
fees incurred to date with regard to all proceedings at the District
Court level with regard to orders compelling discovery and the enforcement thereof'
and in addition payment of attorney fees incurred in taking the deposition of Garcia and in addition attorney
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

88 N.M. 182, 538 P.2d 1204 (Ct. App. 1975).
62 N.M. 391, 310 P.2d 1045 (1957).
88 N.M. at
,538 P.2d 1204, 1205.
88 N.M. 324, 540 P.2d 254 (Ct. App. 1975), cert. den.
Id. at
,540 P.2d 254, 259.

N.M.,,

P.2d (1975).
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fees to be incurred in the future in taking three additional depositions.
Conceding that the imposition of attorney's fees in this instance
was indeed punitive, the question before the Court of Appeals was
whether such sanctions were authorized by Rule 37(d), which
provides:
If a party or an officer or managing agent of a party willfully fails to
appear before the officer who is to take his deposition, after being
served with proper notice, ... the court on motion and notice may

strike out all or any part of any pleading of that party, or dismiss the
action or proceeding or any part thereof, or enter a judgment by
default against that party.
It will be noted that the specific sanction of attorney's fees does not
appear in Rule 37(d). An award of attorney fees is authorized in
Rule 37(a) where a deponent refuses to answer a question and a
court order is obtained to require an answer for the expenses incurred in compelling the answer, but in this case, only a small part of
the attorney's fees awarded was based on expenses incurred in compelling answers during the deposition of Garcia. However, the court
could have entered judgment by default for refusing to go forward
with discovery under the circumstances of this case. The court reasoned that inasmuch as a greater sanction was available, the trial
court should not be limited to the alternatives of imposing the
greater sanction or imposing no sanction at all and therefore
approved the awarding of attorney's fees for failure to permit discovery to proceed.' '
The more drastic sanction of dismissal was invoked by the trial
judge in Beverly v. Conquistadores,Inc.' 9 Although dismissal in this
instance was not based upon Rule 37 for failure to comply with
discovery procedures, the basis for dismissal, failure to disclose
witnesses at pre-trial, is closely akin and thus deserving of mention at
this point. In this case the trial court at pre-trial conference directed
plaintiff's counsel to reveal the names of possible witnesses. When
counsel refused, the trial judge declared: "You are going to have to
disclose the witness or you are going to lose your lawsuit today."
When plaintiff's counsel remained adamant, the trial court dismissed
the action. He pointed out that plaintiff's counsel deliberately did so
58. Similar decisions have occurred under interpretations of the federal discovery rules
where a lesser sanction of attorney's fees had been awarded in lieu of default or dismissal.
Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Giroux, 50 F.R.D. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Underwood v.
Maloney, 20 Fed. Rules Serv. 608 (E.D. Pa. 1954);.Haney v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc.,
330 F.2d 940 (4th Cir. 1964).
59. 88 N.M. 119, 537 P.2d 1015 (Ct. App. 1975).
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[refused to disclose the witness] "in an arrogant and the most unprofessional way the Court has ever seen.""6 0
Although dismissal of the case seems a heavy burden for plaintiff
to bear for recusance of his counsel, nonetheless, counsel in this case
did not wish to reveal the names of his witness until it would have
been almost impossible for the defendant to secure discovery in the
time remaining. Moreover, the attorney was directed by the trial
court to disclose the witness and refused. He was also warned of the
consequences if he failed to do so. There is really no valid reason
such as confidentiality, privilege, or the like which relates to the
disclosure of witnesses before trial which might otherwise serve to
mitigate the conduct of plaintiff's counsel. Accordingly, the ruling of
the Court of Appeals that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion
in this case would seem to be correct and stand as a warning to those
litigants who still are reluctant to permit free and open discovery
before trial.
STANDING
A dramatic change in the law of standing occurred in New Mexico
in the year 1975. Heretofore, the law of standing in the state had
been characterized by a series of complex and far from clear decisions by the Supreme Court. As the Court itself observed in a recent
case, "The entire question of standing in New Mexico is somewhat in
a state of confusion, and it is impossible to reconcile in principle the
many decisions of this Court upon this question." 6
The test laid down in New Mexico for determining standing to
contest governmental action was seemingly that which had previously
been adopted by the United States Supreme Court in the case of
Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. T V.A., 6 2 that a party had no right
to challenge governmental action however prejudicial unless "the
right invaded is a legal right. . . ." Accordingly, in Ruidoso State
Bank v. Brumlow,6" the New Mexico Supreme Court had held that a
competing bank had no standing to challenge the approval of a new
bank by the Commissioner of Banking by virtue of the fact that it
was a potential competitor. The Supreme Court there said that "The
true test is whether appellant's legal rights have been invaded, not
merely whether he has suffered any actual loss or been deprived on
60. Id. at
,537 P.2d 1015, 1018.
61. State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 86 N.M. 359, 363, 524 P.2d 975, 979 (1974).
62. 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
63. Ruidoso State Bank v. Brumlow, 81 N.M. 379, 467 P.2d 395 (1970), overruled, De
Vargas Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Campbell, 87 N.M. 469, 471, 535 P.2d 1320, 1324 (1975).
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any actual pecuniary benefit." 6 This was, in short, a mere reiteration
of the "legal interest" test laid down by the United States Supreme
Court in Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. T V.A.
In the intervening years, however, several important developments
had occurred in the law of standing as it affected New Mexico. First,
insofar as the federal courts were concerned, the "legal interest" rule
set forth in Tennessee Electric Power had been expressly overruled
by the United States Supreme Court in Ass'n of Data Processing
Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,"6 in which the Court adopted a
much more liberal test for determining standing: "whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the
zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or
constitutional guarantee in question." 6 6 In Data Processing the
United States Supreme Court held that companies offering data processing services to the business community had standing to challenge
an order by the Comptroller of the Currency that national banks
could also offer such services to other banks and to their own customers.
In addition to changes in the federal law with respect to standing,
the whole question of the law of standing in New Mexico had
received an intensive critical analysis by Professor Albert Utton of
the UNM Law School in a seminal article printed in this Review. 6 7
Professor Utton, after carefully reviewing federal and state cases on
the law of standing, called for an entirely new approach to the standing problem in New Mexico. He argued from the reasoning of a
recent federal case6" which went even further than Data Processing
in liberalizing the law of standing.
With this background in mind, we can turn to the Supreme Court
of New Mexico's important decision in 1975 in the case of De Vargas
Savings & Loan Ass'n of Santa Fe v. Campbell.6 9 In that case, the
Savings and Loan Supervisor had approved a branch office in Santa
Fe for the Los Alamos Building and Loan Association. Petitioners,
four savings and loan associations located in Santa Fe, sought judicial
review of the supervisor's order in the district court. The latter,
however, dismissed the petition for review on the ground that petitioners lacked standing on the basis of Ruidoso State Bank v. Brumlow. Thus there were clearly presented for decision by the New
64. Id. at 381, 467 P.2d 395, 397.
65. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
66. 397 U.S. 150, 153.
67. Utton, Through a Glass Darkly: The Law of Standing to Challenge Governmental
Action in New Mexico, 2 N.M. L. Rev. 171 (1972).
68. Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
69. 87 N.M. 469, 535 P.2d 1320 (1975).
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Mexico Supreme Court "The broader issues . .. whether or not New
Mexico will continue to cling to the 'legal interest' test of standing in
Ruidoso State Bank v. Brumlow...."
Naturally, if the Supreme Court had chosen to adhere to its earlier
decision in Ruidoso State Bank, the lower court's ruling would have
had to be sustained. Had the court chosen to follow the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Data Processing, however, where
a competitor was permitted to challenge a ruling in favor of another
competitor by the Comptroller of the Currency, then in all probability, the court would have reversed the lower court. However, the
Supreme Court of New Mexico had serious doubts about the validity
or the effectiveness of the Data Processing standard, particularly as
applied in New Mexico. It declared:
Problems arise with the second part of the test in Data Processing
Service, supra, wherein the court is faced with the dilemma of determining the zone of interest to be protected or regulated. This zone
may be apparent from the face of the statute or constitution, but
more often than not the legislative history must be examined, a
difficult or impossible task in New Mexico. Further, Data Processing
Service, supra, seems to exclude all common law or equitable remedies. It seems fundamental that a plaintiff has standing to protect
himself against injury as a result of unlawful governmental action,
even in the absence of a controlling statute or constitutional provision. 7 0
Accordingly, the New Mexico Supreme Court rejected the DataProcessing test and adopted an entirely new test for standing in New
Mexico adhering closely to Professor Utton's recommendations in his
landmark article. The new test was phrased by the court as follows:
We hold that to attain standing in a suit arguing the unlawfulness of
governmental action, the complainant must allege that he is injured
in fact or is imminently threatened with injury, economically or
otherwise. 7 1
The Supreme Court, having set forth this new test based upon injury
in fact, proceeded to overrule Ruidoso State Bank v. Brumlow and
its progeny. Thus has been inaugurated a new era in the law of
standing in New Mexico.
PLEADINGS
The applicability of the Rules of Civil Procedure to proceedings in
workmen's compensation cases was considered by the Court of
70. Id. at 472, 535 P.2d at 1323.
71. Id. at 473, 535 P.2d at 1324.
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7
Appeals in Sentry Ins. Co. v. Gallegos. 2 In general, the rules are
expressly made applicable to workmen's compensation proceedings
by statute unless the rules in some way conflict with the Workmen's
Compensation Act.7"
In the instant case, defendant employee had counterclaimed in a
suit for reimbursement by the insurer. Plaintiff contended that a
counterclaim could not be filed by defendant in a workmen's compensation case. In view of the statutory provision cited supra, however, the Court of Appeals held the counterclaim proper. This,
however, did not entirely dispose of the problem, for plaintiff's complaint had previously been dismissed for lack of standing. Plaintiff
therefore contended that the court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate
the counterclaim in any event. The question presented, then, was:
What is the status of a counterclaim where the original claim is
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction? The general rule prevailing in the
federal courts is set forth in 3 Moore's Federal Practice 13.41 (2d
ed. 1974), wherein it is stated:
Rule 13(i) makes it clear that the dismissal of a claim or other
disposal does not preclude the court from proceeding to judgment
on a counterclaim or cross-claim, subject, of course to the principle
that it has jurisdiction so to do.
Citing several federal cases in support of this proposition, the
Court of Appeals adopted the federal practice. Accordingly, New
Mexico law now parallels federal law on this point.
74
the Court of Appeals
In McCormick v. United Nuclear Corp.
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trial court had granted defendant's motion to dismiss, but upon reexamination of the complaint in the Court of Appeals, it was found
that plaintiff, if certain facts alleged in the complaint were proven,
would have been able to recover. Accordingly, the complaint was
improperly dismissed below.
Judge Sutin adopted the same liberal rules of construction of
pleadings in reversing the lower court in Kirby Cattle Co. v. Shriners
Hospitals for Crippled Children.7" There, the trial court had dis-

72. 87 N.M. 249, 531 P.2d 1222 (Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied 87 N.M. 239, 531 P.2d
1212 (1975).
73. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59-10-13.9 (Repl. 1974).
N.M.
74. 87 N.M. 274, 532 P.3d 203 (Ct. App. 1974), rehearing denied,
(1975).
P.2d
,548 P.2d 449
N.M.
75. 88 N.M. 605, 544 P.2d at 1170 (Ct. App. 1975), rev'd,
(1976).

May 1976]

CIVIL PROCEDURE

missed plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim. Referring to
Rule 8(a)(2), Judge Sutin indicated that the rule was very limited in
contemplation. All that is required is that plaintiff's complaint contain a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief. In making a determination as to whether a complaint states
a valid claim, all facts well pleaded are considered true. Finally, the
complaint will be dismissed only where it appears that under no state
of facts provable thereunder could plaintiff show that he was entitled
to relief. Here, in view of the fact that the plaintiff had based his
claim on a contract of first refusal, it was error to dismiss his complaint. The reversal of this case by the Supreme Court on the ground
that as a matter of law there was no contract of first refusal7 6 does
not militate against the soundness of the opinion of the Court of
Appeals on this point.
The requirement of Rule 9(b) that averments of fraud be stated
with particularity was one basis for decision in Bell v. Weinacker,7 7
in which the Court of Appeals gave instructive lessons to would-be
pleaders. There, plaintiffs sought relief against insurer and its agent
on the basis of two "cancer care" policies. The trial court granted
summary judgment to defendants. One of the plaintiffs' theories of
recovery was based upon the alleged fraud of agent. The Court of
Appeals refused to pass on the propriety of summary judgment on
the fraud issue. Instead, the court held that the fraud claim "is
insufficient to state a basis for relief." In so doing, the court adverted
to Rule 9(b)'s requirement that fraud must be stated with particularity. In other words, a general allegation of fraud will not meet the
requirement. 7 " The court pointed out, however, that this stringent
requirement could be satisfied if the complaint alleged facts from
which fraud could be implied or if the defendant was otherwise
appropriately informed of the fraud claim asserted against him. In
this case, however, the allegations of fraud were insufficient on all
counts. Fortunately for plaintiff, however, the court reversed and
remanded with direction to grant plaintiffs leave to amend their
complaint on the issue of fraud.
Another aspect of Rule 9 also played an important part in a case
decided during 1975. In Skarda v. Skarda7 9 count 12 of plaintiff's
complaint alleged that defendant had failed to fulfill a commitment
to make a loan to allow plaintiff to purchase some real estate.
Defendant pleaded the statute of frauds as one of his defenses. In
76.
N.M.
548 P.2d 449 (1976).
77.
N.M.
,543 P.2d 1185 (Ct. App. 1975).
78. McLean v. Paddock, 78 N.M. 234, 430 P.2d 392 (19
79. 87 N.M. 497, 536 P.2d 257 (1975).
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affirming summary judgment in favor of defendant on count 12, the
Supreme Court pointed out that plaintiff had not complied with
Rule 9(k) nor had he offered any explanation as to why he had not
done so. Rule 9(k) provides:
When any instrument of writing upon which the action or defense is
founded is referred to in the pleadings, the original or a copy thereof
shall be filed with the pleading, if within the power or control of the
party wishing to use the same, and if such original or a copy thereof
be not filed as herein required, or a sufficient reason given for failure
to do so, such instrument of writing shall not be admitted in
evidence upon the trial.

In this instance, plaintiff had not complied with the rule, and
partially for this reason the Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment against him. This decision constitutes an expansion of the rule,
for the only sanction mentioned in the rule for noncompliance is
exclusion of the document not attached from introduction into
evidence. Skarda v. Skarda indicates that a further sanction which
may be imposed upon a party failing to comply with the rule may be
entry of summary judgment against him.
The subject of amendment of pleadings came up in the case of
8
Kirby Cattle Co. v. Shriners Hospitals. 0 There, the Court of Appeals
stated the liberal rule of law applicable to the amendment of pleadings under Rule 15(a). The trial court had refused to allow plaintiff
to file a first amended complaint based upon the judge's erroneous
construction of the law. The court emphasized the rule prevailing in
New Mexico that "The right to amend should be permitted with
liberality in the furtherance of justice." Although the decision as to
whether to grant leave to amend or not is usually left to the discretion of the trial court, here it was an abuse of discretion for the trial
judge to refuse to allow leave to amend because of his erroneous
interpretation of the law. This decision was subsequently reversed by
the Supreme Court on the ground that "as a matter of law, there was
neither an option contract nor a right of first refusal. . .

."'

This

does not detract from the validity of the decision of the Court of
Appeals on the general rules of liberality to be applied when ruling
on motions to amend.
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of amendment of 2pleadings at trial in Dale J.Bellamah Corp. v. City of Santa Fe. The
80. 88 N.M. 605, 544 P.2d 1170 (Ct. App. 1975), rev'd,
(1976).
,548 P.2d at 451.
N.M. at
81.
82. 88 N.M. 288, 540 P.2d 218 (1975).

N.M.

,548

P.2d 449
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Santa Fe city council passed an ordinance by a 3 to 2 vote which
allowed plaintiff to build a shopping center on property previously
zoned residential. The difficulty, however, was that state law requires
a majority of all members of the council to vote in favor of adopting
an ordinance or resolution. In this instance, this would have required
a vote of four members of the council.
Plaintiff brought suit to enjoin the council from reconsidering the
zoning ordinance, and defendant's counsel orally entered a general
denial to the complaint. The case was then set for trial. At the
hearing, defendant presented evidence that the ordinance was invalid
because it lacked the vote of a majority of members of the council.
In accordance with this evidence, the trial court found as a matter of
law that:
The purported action of the Defendant City of Santa Fe, by its
City Council, in voting on July 11, 1973, to adopt by a vote of three
city council members in the affirmative, a City Ordinance No.
1973-25, was illegal and void, since state law requires City Ordinances to be adopted by a majority vote of the City Council, and a
majority did not vote in the affirmative.8 3

Plaintiff argued that the invalidity of the ordinance was not properly
before the court. In this instance, it should be noted that the invalidity of the ordinance had not been pleaded as an affirmative defense
and defendants had not amended their answer to include this defense
at any time during or after the trial. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
pointed out that under Rule 15(b) relating to amendments to
conform to the evidence, the pleadings are deemed amended to
conform to the proof when evidence is presented without objection
at the trial. The court held that Rule 15(b) was applicable to the
instant case and that the pleadings should be deemed amended to
conform to the issues raised at trial. Moreover, that defendant had
not in fact amended the pleadings to conform was irrelevant and did
not affect the validity of the trial court's findings on the issues so
tried.
The court pointed out that harsh as the result might seem, if
plaintiff had objected and had shown prejudice to its case by the
introduction of issues foreign to the pleadings, the court would have
had an opportunity to grant plaintiff a continuance to enable it to
meet the evidence.
This decision is emminently sound and is a far cry from the strict
construction of pleadings which used to characterize decisions by the
83. Id. at

,540 P.2d 218, 220.
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8 4 Indeed, the court,
New Mexico Supreme Court in the hoary past.
citing J. W. Moore, concluded very properly in this case that "Pleadings are the means to assist, not deter, the disposition of litigation on
the merits."

STATUTORY DEVELOPMENTS

A number of statutes dealing with procedure originated in the
New Mexico state legislature during 1975. One of the most important of these was a law permitting certification from the federal
courts to the Supreme Court of New Mexico of questions involving
New Mexico law where there are no controlling decisions on the
matter in either the Supreme Court or the New Mexico Court of
The statute is very similar to legislation enacted in
Appeals.8
Florida a number of years ago which authorizes certification from
federal appellate courts of questions of state law to the Florida
Supreme Court, the principal difference being that New Mexico
under its new law provides for certification from District Courts of
the United States as well.6 It is interesting to note that for more
than 15 years the Florida law went unutilized because it was never
implemented by court rule.8 " Since adoption of court rule, however,
At last
the procedure has been used with increasing frequency.
8 8 and WashingMaine
in
force
in
were
count, similar provisions
ton,8 9 and certification had been adopted by court rule in Mon9 In addition, a certification statute has
tana9 0 and New Hampshire.
9
been recommended by the Commission on Uniform State Laws, 2
which has been adopted in Colorado, Maryland, Minnesota, and
Oklahoma.
The reason for the new law may be traced back to the famous case
of Erie R. Co. v. Tomkins9 3 where the Supreme Court of the United
States held that federal courts sitting in diversity cases must apply
state law. The question often arises, however, as to what state law is
84. See, e.g., Campbell v. Hollywood Race Ass'n, 54 N.M. 260, 221 P.2d 558 (1950),
overruled, State v. Fireman's Fund Indemnity Co., 67 N.M. 360, 364, 355 P.2d 291, 294
(1960).
85. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 16-2-7 (Supp. 1975).
86. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 25.031 (1961).
87. Kaplan, Certification of Questions from Federal Appellate Courts to the Florida
Supreme Court and its Impact on the Abstention Doctrine, 16 U. Miami L. Rev. 413, 427
(1962).
88. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., tit. 14, Rule 76B (Supp. 1975).
89. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § § 2.60.020, 2.60.030 (Supp. 1965).
90. Mont. Sup. Ct. R. 1.
91. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 490, App. R. 20 (Supp. 1973).
92. Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act.
93. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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in the absence of authoritative interpretation by the state's highest
courts. Heretofore, the federal courts have either had to assume the
heavy burden of creating state law on their own initiative or resort to
the so-called doctrine of abstention whereby the federal court stayed
its hand pending resolution by the parties themselves of the issues of
state law in the state courts. Abstention never proved a satisfactory
way of dealing with the question, however, and it was to alleviate the
problems of abstention that the certification laws were adopted.
Under the new law in New Mexico, problems such as those arising in
the Budde case, supra, may be resolved in the future by permitting
the federal court to seek an authoritative interpretation of state law
where none presently exists without the federal courts presuming to
create state law on one hand and without depriving the parties of a
federal forum on the other.
Another important legislative development in New Mexico in 1975
as it concerns the law of civil procedure was the enactment of a new
Declaratory Judgment Act 9 4 which is patterned largely after the
Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act.9" The Uniform Declaratory
Judgment Act has been adopted with notable success by a large
number cf jurisdictions over the years.9 6 The new law will accordingly bring New Mexico law in line with that generally prevailing
throughout the United States, particularly in view of the admonition
in the statute that requires interpretation of the Act in accordance
with federal law and with the law of those other jurisdictions adopting the Uniform Act. 9 ' Declaratory relief has long been available in
the State of New Mexico 9" and the remedy has been used extensively. With the new statute, however, the scope of declaratory relief
should be broadened considerably, particularly in light of the admonition that the law shall be liberally construed. 9

94. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-6-4,-18 (Supp. 1975).
95. Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act.
96. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, District of Columbia,
Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North
Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island,
South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virgin Islands, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
97. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-6-18 (Supp. 1975).
98. Laws of N.M. 1935, Ch. 143, § § 1-3.
99. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-6-17 (Supp. 1975):

